Download Macmillan English Language Book 2 Category:Language learning softwareQ: How is side-channel attack possible? I am reading the paper Trojans that Walk on Water: A survey of side-channel attacks. The paper says that in side-channel attack, an attacker monitors a covert channel to the target and is trying to learn the secrets through them. It also says that a side-channel attack is always a covert attack. If a side-channel attack is always covert then how is it possible? A: No, in general, side channel attacks are not covert, and they are not always side-channel. If an attacker is able to place a sensor on the target in a way that the attacker knows it is there without arousing suspicion, he may then be able to use the sensor to learn information about the target. In some cases, he may be able to learn this information without showing any outwardly detectable signs of his presence or his activities. As a trivial example, suppose the sensor is a thermal imager, the target is a smart device, and that the attacker knows that the subject is a smart device. He may then be able to learn the CPU temperature. In this instance, the attack is lateral, in the sense that the attacker doesn't detect the presence of the attacker, but it is no more covert than a normal attack. A: Since this is the end of a series of questions on the same topic, I will address the OP's question at the same time: From the paper's Abstract: Side-channel attacks are fundamentally different from other types of security exploits. By exploiting some vulnerabilities in the design of systems, side-channels can steal cryptographic keys, passwords or information that is very personal to the user. A side-channel attack therefore should not be confused with a covert eavesdropping attack, because the targets of a covert eavesdropping attack may not be aware of any covert activity. On multiple occasions, we learn about how side-channels leak information. This leak is often not a covert leak (an attacker is not trying to hide their presence) and does not need to be. As a very simple example, if we could peek at the power consumption of a computer, we could learn that the computer is running, because the power usage increases by the current the CPU is burning. If we know that the computer isn't running, we can also learn that the computer isn't running. Another side- The Practice Book contains practice exercises for the Language Book activities. Contents: MONTH 1: CATEGORIES 1. 1 You are running in a race. 2 Women and Men.:157) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:206) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:87) at org.sonatype.nexus.orient.support.AbstractNexusFilter.doFilter(AbstractNexusFilter.java:76) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:205) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:87) at org.apache.logging.log4j.web.Log4jServletFilter.doFilter(Log4jServletFilter.java:71) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:205) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:87) at com.liferay.portal.kernel.servlet.filters.invoker.InvokerFilter.doFilter(InvokerFilter.java:96) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:205) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:87) at com.liferay.portal.kernel.servlet.filters.workspace.WorkspaceFilter.addContextServlet(WorkspaceFilter.java:120) at com.liferay.portal.kernel.servlet.filters.workspace.WorkspaceFilter.addInitialFilter(WorkspaceFilter.java:80) at com.liferay.portal.servlet.filters.invoker.InvokerFilter.addInitialFilter(InvokerFilter.java:229) at com.liferay.portal.servlet.filters.invoker.InvokerFilter.init(InvokerFilter 570a42141b
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